



Complex Linkages between Forced Labor Slavery and Environmental Decline in Marine 1 
Fisheries 2 
Recent media attention on human rights abuses in the fishing sector, precipitated by 3 
undercover investigations from non-governmental organizations and investigative journalists 4 
(e.g., Environmental Justice Foundation [EJF] 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Mendoza et al. 2016), has 5 
prompted calls from the scientific community for increased transdisciplinary and empirical 6 
research of fisheries’ social dimensions such as labor (Kittinger et al. 2017). Given views that 7 
social and ecological systems are interdependent (Ostrom 2009), the need for theory 8 
development to explicate pathways for how this interdependence occurs and the potential for 9 
using policy and practices for intervention and prevention exists. Integrating ecological data and 10 
economics and human rights theory, Brashares et al.’s (2014) Wildlife Decline and Social 11 
Conflict framework offered a hypothesis about the negative association between fish stock 12 
declines and child slavery. Yet, more precision in terminology, pathways, and feedbacks may be 13 
warranted. With the aim of exploring empirical, conceptual, and theoretical support for 14 
Brashares et al.’s (2014) pathways, the presented revised theory posits how forced labor slavery 15 
and environmental decline in marine fisheries may be linked.  16 
For modern, forced labor slavery, empirical testing is limited by risks to researchers, 17 
prohibitive costs and time requirements, a dearth of baseline data, and the study population’s 18 
hidden nature. When considering linkages between forced labor slavery and environmental 19 
decline in marine fisheries, these challenges are further compounded by the physical 20 
inaccessibility of fishing vessels sailing hundreds of miles from shores (Stringer and Simmons 21 
2015). Instead starting with a theoretical framework can help elucidate how and when the 22 




labor slavery contributes to environmental decline; and inform labor and fisheries practices, 24 
management, and policies in the absence of empirical data to simultaneously minimize labor 25 
abuses of fishers and environmental decline. Further, to help advance fisheries toward the 26 
eradication of human rights violations and the human rights sector toward prevention, a 27 
framework can provide guidelines and origins for data collection, ensuring more efficacious 28 
resource use, and can be modified once empirical evidence is generated. 29 
The potential connections between environmental decline and exploitative labor practices 30 
in marine fisheries are important to consider. Due to human dependence on fish for food, 31 
livelihood, and nutrition (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO] 2014, 32 
2016), human well-being cannot be disentangled from healthy ecosystems and sustainable 33 
fisheries use. From the social systems perspective, if shocks to fisheries create economic 34 
pressures within a pre-existing context of social vulnerability already known to yield slavery, 35 
then fish stock declines may exacerbate and accelerate the use of forced labor slavery in the 36 
sector by providing an economically rational tipping point into the practice. Thus, failing to 37 
recognize how environmental decline contributes to and compounds social vulnerabilities could 38 
undermine interventions aimed at eradicating slavery. These interventions risk being siloed 39 
within social systems and ignoring ecological feedbacks. From the ecological systems 40 
perspective, not considering the extent of unique environmental pressures produced by the use of 41 
forced labor slavery could subvert attempts to stabilize stocks and to efficiently maximizing 42 
sustainable yields. Thus, when stocks decline, social consequences may increase vulnerabilities 43 
for fish dependent persons (e.g., Golden et al. 2016; Perry and Sumaila 2007). As a result, these 44 
feedbacks create a multifaceted problem that requires multiple and holistic interventions and 45 




will consider such associations by defining what constitutes forced labor slavery in the 21st 47 
century. Brashares’ (2014) original framework and critique will be presented along with a 48 
revised framework, and diverse knowledge sources to support pathways. 49 
Defining forced labor slavery 50 
The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention Concerning Forced or 51 
Compulsory Labor (1930) defines forced labor as “all work or service which is extracted from 52 
any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered 53 
himself voluntarily” (Convention 29, Article 2). The ILO’s Special Action Programme to 54 
Combat Forced Labour suggests 11 indicators to identify potential victims of forced labor 55 
slavery. While the presence of just one indicator could constitute a case of forced labor, it is 56 
often thought of as a continuum, based on victims’ vulnerabilities and severity and number of 57 
indicators present (Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour 2012).  58 
For this paper forced labor slavery will be defined as the involuntary entry and “holding 59 
of people at a workplace through force, fraud, or coercion for purposes of forced labor so that the 60 
slaveholder can extract profit” (Free the Salves 2017 What is Slavery?). Slavery was selected 61 
over human trafficking, a primarily legal term subjected to nuanced, and often conflicting, 62 
interpretations from diverse legal institutions influenced by various external forces (Bales 2017). 63 
Instead this definition centers victims’ experiences, versus legal frameworks (Bales 2017), and is 64 
holistic enough to encompass all aspects of forced labor slavery while also noting the shift from 65 
historical to modern slavery. In his theory of modern slavery, Bales suggests that slavery as a 66 
construct should still be defined by the relationship between victim and perpetrator (consistent 67 
with historical slavery), but that that over time slavery has shifted from an owner-property 68 




exploitation) while the perpetrator’s profits increase (2006). Other shifts include the transposition 70 
of unfreedoms from point of entry into the exploitative relationship (historical slavery) to the 71 
point of exit from the relationship (modern slavery) (Barrientos et al. 2013; Phillips and Mieres 72 
2015; Stringer et al. 2016) and control of the victim at point of entry into the relationship being 73 
exerted by a person (historical slavery) to socioeconomic conditions (modern) (O’Neill 2011). 74 
Indeed, while some victimized fishers are purchased by boat captains (Chantavanich et al. 2016), 75 
many exhibit the semblance of agency at point of entry caused by desperation to meet basic 76 
needs and exploited by brokers and/or recruiters’ deception (O’Neill 2011).  77 
The shift from historical to modern slavery has further complicated the identification of 78 
forced labor slavery, and often exploitation in the fishing sector has been minimized as poor 79 
labor practices (Stringer et al. 2016). As a result, investigative journalism’s contributions to 80 
eradicating abuses in the fishing sector exceeds the scientific community’s, requiring researchers 81 
to improve their consideration and inclusion of equity, equality, and social justice in 82 
environmental and sustainability research (Kittinger et al. 2017). Whereas investigative 83 
journalism has confirmed and generated mainstream media attention about the presence of labor 84 
exploitation in the fishing sector, the scientific community can advance this work by linking 85 
social and ecological processes to outcomes such as forced labor. Additionally, though multiple 86 
white papers have credibly postulated bidirectional relationships between fish stock declines and 87 
forced labor slavery (see EJF 2015b; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] 88 
2011), empirical evidence is limited and improved research is needed to understand how strongly 89 
the issues are linked and the processes that facilitate these linkages. 90 




Brashares et al. (2014) offered a specific theoretical framework hypothesizing how fish 92 
stock declines may be driving increases in child slavery through an amalgamation of human 93 
rights, political ecology, conservation biology and ecology, public health, and economic theory 94 
(Fig. 1). Building on the UNODC’s (2011) investigation that posited a potential relationship 95 
between declining fish stocks and human trafficking (section 1.5.4), the authors proposed that 96 
declining fish stocks force vessels to fish longer, farther from shore, and deeper in waters to 97 
maintain yields, increasing “production costs” (Brashares et al. 2014 p. 376).  The framework 98 
hypothesizes cheap labor as an approach to offset increasing costs and continue harvesting fish 99 
species at a rate that would otherwise be cost-prohibitive, thus potentially increasing exploitative 100 
labor practices to the point of child enslavement (Brashares et al. 2014). While Brashares et al. 101 
emphasize child slavery, it is expected that their hypothesis is more relevant to exploited adult 102 
laborers, as indicators for child slavery must consider differing cultural norms around child 103 
work, particularly between developing and developed countries.  104 
Citing a lack of empirical evidence for all pathways, critics denounced the framework for 105 
oversimplifying a complex problem and making too big of a conceptual leap from fishery 106 
declines to slavery, thus conflating the environment’s role in perpetuating slavery (Mauda and 107 
Scharks 2014). Though Brashares et al. were unable to support their pathways with empirical 108 
data at publication, it does not mean the phenomenon under investigation is implausible, nor 109 
does it preclude future studies from empirically confirming the model. Scientific precedent exists 110 
for empirically uncorroborated models having great utility in directing future research and 111 
advancing understanding of complex phenomenon (e.g., string theory) (Dawid 2006; Dawid et 112 
al. 2015). And in the social sciences, common scientific practice is to move from hypothesis 113 




pertinent constructs (e.g., predictors, mediators, modifiers) into schemas to better predict 115 
outcomes and events under study (Jaccard and Jacoby 2010). 116 
Though Mauda and Scharks (2014) cited literature from 2005 that did not consider 117 
environmental degradation as a driver of slavery (Surtees), current literature is beginning to 118 
consider larger environmental and market driven processes, including overfishing as a “key 119 
associated driver” of maritime crime (e.g., forced labor) (Pomeroy et al. 2016 p. 96) and how 120 
slavery may be escalating environmental degradation which in turn increases slavery (Bales 121 
2016). Investigations also suggest the fishing industry is one of the biggest users of slave labor, 122 
with an estimated 1.8 million people enslaved in the agriculture/fishing sector (ILO and Walk 123 
Free Foundation 2017), including on fishing vessels originating from and/or berthed in the 124 
United States, Thailand, New Zealand, and Peru amongst numerous others (Bales 2016; EJF 125 
2014, 2015a; FishWise 2014; ILO 2013; International Transport Workers Federation [ITF] 2006; 126 
Mendoza et al. 2016; Verité 2016; Yea 2014).  127 
 Mauda and Scharks’ (2014) concerns about needlessly reallocating or misappropriating 128 
resources are germane. However, the persistence of forced labor slavery in marine fisheries 129 
(International Labor Rights Forum [ILRF] 2018) warrants a challenge to the dominant paradigm 130 
that has seemingly not produced reductions in the problem. This new discourse, instead, should 131 
consider contributing factors external to social vulnerabilities (e.g., environmental decline) that 132 
may influence the use of forced labor by creating a demand for free or cheap labor. And it should 133 
question the framing of slavery’s contributions to illegal and overfishing, wherein isolated 134 
environmental policies lacking an understanding of forced labor slavery’s contributions to 135 
environmental decline may inadvertently blame or punish slavery victims. This potentially more 136 




and multifaceted interventions could also advance the field by shifting it from reactive to 138 
preventive practices. No economic or other incentive is known to cease using forced labor 139 
slavery once its use has generated increased profits. Therefore, to reduce the prevalence of this 140 
linked social-ecological injustice, interconnected interventions must prevent it before it happens. 141 
Brashares’ Wildlife Decline and Social Conflict framework revised 142 
 While Brashares’ framework is sufficiently developed to encourage empirical testing to 143 
confirm pathways and link previously disparate research fields, a more robust discussion of 144 
underlying theories may provide non-experimental confirmation of pathways to repudiate 145 
previous critiques. Building upon Brashares’ original framework, a revised framework with 146 
altered constructs is presented (Fig. 2). Tentative construct changes (Table 1) were made to be 147 
consistent with human rights literature and theory and to emphasize power differentials that 148 
incite exploitative labor relationships, giving the powerful economic advantages while 149 
commodifying human beings (Manzo 2005; Phillips and Mieres 2015). Support for each 150 
construct and pathway in the revised framework will be described below. 151 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 152 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 153 
Contextual Constructs 154 
 While forced labor slavery is a global phenomenon, not all fishers are enslaved, and 155 
context influences the labor relationship between fishers and employers. Important conditions 156 
explaining why forced labor slavery persists in the fishing industry include geographic, 157 
regulatory, cultural, socioeconomic, and industry contexts—all constructs derived from Bales’ 158 
(2006) and Crane’s (2013) theories of modern slavery (Fig. 2). These constructs also provide the 159 




contexts create an environment that not only accommodates, but enables slavery. They also 161 
interact with each other and with the socioeconomic context, creating the slave labor supply, and 162 
the industry context, creating the “demand” for slave labor. Though the operationalization of 163 
these broad concepts varies by country and region, key indicators of each that should be assessed 164 
in future empirical work are described. Moreover, while the importance of each contextual 165 
construct and indicator in driving slavery may vary across regions, it is the confluence of these 166 
factors in creating no viable alternatives (either actual of perceived) for victims, which leads 167 
them into forced labor slavery experiences. 168 
 Geographic context 169 
 While forced labor slavery occurs in developed, transitional, and developing countries, 170 
geographic factors such as a high density of migrant laborers and geographic isolation appear to 171 
increase the use of forced labor slavery (Crane 2013; ILO 2005; Robertson 2011). Empirical 172 
evidence suggests that migrants are the most vulnerable population to forced labor slavery 173 
(Chantavanich et al. 2016; ILO 2005; International Organization for Migration [IOM] 2008; 174 
Wheaton et al. 2010). Their movement may be documented or undocumented, and is predicated 175 
on perceived opportunity in the form of higher wages or greater availability of work in the new 176 
area (Bales 2006, 2007; Chuang 2006; Robertson 2011; Wheaton et al. 2010). Brokers and 177 
recruiters working for boat owners target them through formal and informal mechanisms, in 178 
markets before their migration (offering “assistance” with their movement), and after their 179 
relocation in migrant reception centers (IOM 2008; Robertson 2011). Other pressures (e.g., 180 
population growth and environmental degradation) are also limiting work opportunities further 181 
inland, driving more migrants to coastal areas (Creel 2003), and thus the fishing sector. 182 




extraction industries), fishing is an economic activity that occurs at specific sites, which can be 184 
hundreds of miles from shore (Crane 2013). This distinct separation and geographic distance 185 
minimizes contact between victims and law enforcement, family, civil society and aid 186 
organizations, and professional groups, intensifying fishers’ dependence on their abusers which 187 
increases the perpetrator’s power (Fletcher et al. 2005). Over time, the experience becomes 188 
normalized, and as enslavers continue to gain power, it lowers the amount of resources needed to 189 
dominate the victims—further reducing the cost of using slaves (Crane 2013). This isolation also 190 
limits the reach of regulatory powers. In localities with effective labor laws, inspectors or 191 
enforcement agents often cannot access vessels at sea for compliance monitoring, thus violations 192 
are unnoticed. And the plethora of geographic and physical boundaries transected by marine 193 
fishing vessels exposes loopholes in labor regulations even in developed countries (MacFarlane 194 
2017). Vessels will also engage in transshipping, the use of mother ships or reefer ships to 195 
unload their catch, refuel, and restock in the middle of the ocean to prevent berthing in ports. 196 
Using transshipping, some vessels have reportedly remained at sea for several years (EJF 2015a). 197 
As a result, the geographic context shapes the regulatory context because illegal practices like 198 
slavery persist in industries that “operate beyond the oversight of regulations and other formal 199 
institutions” (Crane 2013 p. 54). 200 
Regulatory context 201 
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights illegalizes slavery everywhere, 202 
ineffective governance fosters environments where forced labor slavery still thrives. The use of 203 
forced labor slavery most frequently occurs in countries characterized by government complicity, 204 
political instability, high levels of corruption, limited regulations, regulatory failures, and poor 205 




despite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent conventions, international 207 
frameworks do not “translate into real protections unless they are incorporated into national 208 
legislation and implemented effectively” (ITF 2006 p. 9). 209 
Pomeroy et al.’s (2016) theoretical ‘fish wars’ framework also posited that in the absence 210 
of effective governance in fisheries, natural resource scarcity can result in increased social 211 
conflict (including human trafficking and forced labor).  The social conflict contributes to the 212 
environmental degradation through feedback loops predicated on increased competition. 213 
Examples of weak governance in fisheries include corruption, lack of stakeholder participation, 214 
political will and capacity, weak institutional capacity and capabilities, poor enforcement, and 215 
inadequate information and data. Investigative case studies also suggest that vessels using forced 216 
labor are often disregarding international and national environmental regulations and engaging in 217 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU) fishing (EJF 2015b). IUU activities may 218 
involve knowingly violating catch quotas; purposefully not reporting, under reporting, or 219 
falsifying catches; fishing without a license; fishing in protected areas; catching certain species 220 
that are illegal; and using illegal fishing gears. The persistence of IUU is often facilitated by 221 
regulatory corruption, limited enforcement capacity, and loopholes in policies rendering the 222 
environmentally destructive fishing activities unregulated but not necessarily illegal (Global 223 
Ocean Commission 2013).  224 
However, forced labor slavery is not just limited to fisheries in developing countries. It 225 
also occurs in developed and transitional countries because the fishing industry is often part of 226 
the informal economy— industries that lack employment security, benefits, and labor laws and 227 
regulations—making laborers more vulnerable to exploitation (Hart 1973).  228 




Deep-rooted discriminatory beliefs and social inequalities within cultural contexts 230 
exclude groups of people from rights and protections and inhibit equitable development, 231 
particularly economically, by assigning these groups a subordinate status in society—thus 232 
making them more vulnerable to slavery (Crane 2013; Free the Slaves 2017). For migrants, this 233 
discrimination may occur in both their origin and destination countries. In certain geographic 234 
regions these discriminations are institutionalized by the regulatory context. Even if labor laws 235 
and regulations exist, they may not be applied equitably, or can legally discriminate against an 236 
individual based on gender, race, tribe, caste, religion, or immigration/migration status, resulting 237 
in most forced labor slavery victims identifying with at least one minority group (Crane 2013; 238 
Upadhyaya 2008). For example, in many countries, foreign-born, migrant workers are exempt 239 
from local labor laws. Additionally, in some countries, types of permissible work are determined 240 
by informal norms regarding social membership. As a result, entire groups of already vulnerable 241 
people become further marginalized which means they will also disproportionately incur 242 
socioeconomic challenges.  243 
 Socioeconomic context 244 
Geographic, regulatory, and cultural contextual variables combined create structural 245 
vulnerabilities that exacerbate socioeconomic inequalities. These socioeconomic inequalities 246 
may include wealth gaps, and disparities in income, poverty and education levels, and access to 247 
financial institutions (Andrees 2008; Bales 2006, 2007; Crane 2013). The inequalities may also 248 
occur intercountry (e.g., Thailand’s economic growth relative to poorer neighboring countries 249 
like Cambodia and Laos that facilitates migration from Cambodia into Thailand) or intracountry 250 
(e.g., Myanmar’s economic growth that is creating greater income inequality between skilled 251 




inequalities (Barner et al. 2014). Factors that can moderate the relationship between 253 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities and forced labor slavery include access to affordable credit and 254 
education (including literacy and language skills). However, migrant populations often lack both, 255 
and culturally entrenched discrimination further limits their access, increasing their desperation 256 
and vulnerability to coercion (Andrees 2008).  257 
Combined, socioeconomic inequalities create a surplus population vulnerable to forced 258 
labor slavery (the slave labor “supply”). The increased availability of “cheap labor” then causes 259 
the price of slaves to decrease, further inflating slaveholder’s profits (Bales 2012; Crane 2013). 260 
This socioeconomic context also interacts with the contextual constructs in that migrant 261 
populations (geographic) are adversely incorporated into society, and thus the society’s fishing 262 
sector, because of laws (regulatory) and discrimination (cultural). This adverse incorporation 263 
reinforces poverty, thus a population vulnerable to slavery persists (Phillips and Mieres 2015). 264 
 Industry context 265 
Whereas the socioeconomic context provides the “supply,” the industry context creates 266 
the “demand.” Research suggests that modern forced labor slavery is most likely to occur in 267 
industries reliant on manual labor, exhibiting high labor intensity and low technological 268 
development, and operating in the informal economy under poor regulations (Bales 2012, 2016; 269 
Chuang 2006; Crane 2013; ILO 2009). Motivated by profits, forced labor slavery represents an 270 
economically rational decision to employers because it is “an opportunity to reduce the main 271 
costs driving profitability” (Crane 2013 p. 54; Wheaton et al. 2010). Because labor is often one 272 
of few production elements employers can control, the economic benefits of forced labor slavery 273 
are greater in labor intense industries where profit margins at the supply chain’s source are 274 




fishing already has a propensity for using forced labor slavery, it is not implausible to consider 276 
that fish stock declines and forced labor slavery are linked issues, especially considering that 277 
many adaptations to stock declines (e.g., increased effort) likely constrain profits further. Then 278 
the use of forced labor incentivizes increased pressures on stocks by delaying overfishing’s 279 
unprofitability.  280 
Empirical pathways  281 
Declining fish stocks decrease fish catch-per-unit-effort  282 
Though the discourse about how dire stock declines are continues between conservation 283 
and fisheries management approaches (Worm et al. 2009), in 2013, an estimated 31.4% of 284 
marine fish stocks were overfished beyond biologically sustainable levels. This was a more than 285 
20% increase from 1974 (FAO 2016). While management strategies have been effective in 286 
stabilizing some stocks, a global meta-analysis of overfished stocks determined that many stocks 287 
will likely take substantially more time to recover than initially predicted—even under 288 
aggressive, best-case scenario conservation and management approaches (Neubauer et al. 2013).  289 
When marine fish stocks decline, catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) also decreases (Daskalov 290 
2002; Pauly and Zeller 2016; Pontecorvo and Schrank 2012, 2014; Tsikliras et al. 2015; Watson 291 
et al. 2013). While there are examples of CPUE increasing amidst stock declines (Harley et al. 292 
2001; Rose and Kulka 1999), this outcome is dependent on numerous other factors such as 293 
fishing fleet efficiency, changes in fishing technique and skill level, and technology 294 
advancements (Maunder et al. 2006)—all which typically require substantial financial capital. 295 
Since forced labor slavery, in all industries, is used to increase profit because it requires limited 296 
financial investment, vessels using slave labor are unlikely to be motivated to expend financial 297 




Others suggest that declining catch may be an indicator of better fishery regulations 299 
(Worm et al. 2009). While this may be relevant for some marine areas, it is not pertinent to the 300 
proposed framework since all slavery activities are illegal and occur outside the realm of labor 301 
and other regulations. Further, the observed co-occurrence of IUU fishing and forced labor 302 
slavery in investigative case studies from Thailand (see EJF 2015b) suggests that forced labor 303 
slavery may be more likely to occur on vessels fishing in unregulated areas or areas where 304 
fishery regulation enforcement is unfeasible or non-existent—consistent with the use of forced 305 
labor slavery in deforestation (Bales 2016). Illegal fishing also frequently results in non-306 
compliance with other environmental, national, and international regulations and actions (Agnew 307 
et al. 2009). While the economic benefits of IUU already far exceed the risks of being 308 
apprehended or fined (Sumaila et al. 2006), the use of slave labor likely further reduces the risk. 309 
However, more robust empirical data is still needed. 310 
Declining fish catch-per-unit-effort increases effort 311 
When CPUE decreases, vessels fish longer, deeper, and further, increasing effort (Bell et 312 
al. 2016; Gascuel et al. 2016; Hutchings and Myers 1995; Pontecorvo and Schrank 2014; 313 
Tsikliras et al. 2015; Watson et al. 2013). Critics of Brashares et al.’s original framework, citing 314 
contrary evidence, argued that fish stock and catch declines lead to decreased effort (Smith 315 
2014). However, Smith’s cited findings were less precise and more speculative, relying on 316 
predictive modeling for future forecasting that used cross-sectional data (Liese et al. 2007) or 317 
data from a 14-year period at best (Bjørndal and Conrad 1987). The study of Kenyan fishers 318 
questioned about their willingness to exit the artisanal fishing industry in light of hypothetical 319 
fish decline scenarios (Cinner et al. 2009) is also likely not applicable, since artisanal fisheries 320 




While investigations have uncovered slavery victims on short and long-haul vessels and on boats 322 
fishing in territorial waters and the high seas (Chantavanich et al. 2016; Mendoza et al. 2016), 323 
the commercial nature of the fishing vessel appears to be a common characteristic. 324 
In contrast, data suggesting increased effort amidst stock and catch declines used more 325 
robust and rigorous methodologies, including longitudinal data sets with more time points. Bell 326 
et al. (2016), calculated effort and catch using a global sample generated by the FAO and other 327 
sources over a 62-year period, 1950-2012. Watson et al. (2013), aggregated data from the 328 
European Union, FAO, global tuna commissions, and the Commission for the Conservation of 329 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), arguably one of the more reputable regional 330 
fishery management organizations, over a 56-year period, 1950-2006. Further, Hutchings and 331 
Myers (1995), created a 450-year historical reconstruction of Northern cod catch and effort based 332 
on iterative analyses of archival records, the North Atlantic Fishery Organization’s database 333 
(1954-1994), and a spatial analysis of effort using historical documents. While it is likely 334 
scenarios exist where declining CPUE does not lead to increased effort based on contextual 335 
factors, the rigorous studies described suggest that numerous scenarios exist where CPUE does 336 
lead to increased effort, and it is in these fisheries that forced labor slavery is likely to occur. 337 
Increased effort decreases profit margins 338 
 Applying Clark’s (1990) ‘stock effect’ to fishing, White et al. concluded that “the cost to 339 
catch a fish increases as the density of a fish population declines…thus more intensive fishing 340 
pressures [increased effort] may compromise profit” (2008 p. 371). Fish stock declines in coastal 341 
areas have driven fishing vessels out to the high seas; yet the technology and other increased 342 




fishing and fisheries are not profitable without government subsidies or other cost-cutting  344 
measures in relation to labor expenses (Gjerde et al. 2013; Sala et al. 2018).  345 
Research reliably estimating fishing costs, which directly impacts profit margins, is 346 
limited. However, a longitudinal study coupling global catch and economic data from 1951-1999 347 
found a 95% revenue decline during the study period (Sethi et al. 2010). If revenue is decreasing 348 
and cost is increasing, it is expected that profit margins would also decrease. 349 
Theoretical pathways 350 
 Theoretical pathways are the relationships between constructs which are supported by an 351 
integrated set of disciplinary theories which are used to explain the processes of why and how 352 
forced labor slavery persists. 353 
Decreased profits increase demand for cheap labor  354 
Increases in demand for cheap labor are an adaptation to profit losses driven by economic 355 
motives. The Domar Serfdom Model postulates that businesses are constantly seeking economic 356 
gains, which are typically made through production control. However, when production is 357 
scarce, it becomes more economically advantageous to own the labor force instead of production 358 
(Domar 1970). The hypothesis initially described increases in agricultural serfdom in the 16th 359 
and 17th century as a response to land scarcity, and was broadened by Domar to include 360 
production scarcity, with production encompassing resources and capital (1970).  It is plausible 361 
the model would apply to natural resources, like fish, as other economists have identified fish 362 
functioning as capital (Brown 2000). Fish in marine ecosystems are considered a global common 363 
good that no particular party owns, and with the increase in high seas fishing and the presence of 364 




element—labor. As such, unfree labor functions like government subsidies, delaying the tipping 366 
point from profitable to unprofitable (Sala et al. 2018).  367 
Consistent with other commodity-oriented global value chains (GVCs), when fishing 368 
profits decrease market pressures drive owners or operators to resort to measures to remain 369 
competitive (Chantavanich et al. 2016). Fishing is a profit-driven industry, where net profit 370 
drives harvest decisions, creating a ‘race for fish’ that rewards fishers who can harvest the most 371 
fish and maximize individual economic gains by reducing input costs (Sethi et al. 2010). And in 372 
the fishing industry cheap, migrant labor (regardless of how it is obtained) is considered a 373 
legitimate, and one of the primary, strategies for remaining competitive (ITF 2006).  374 
 Increased demand for cheap labor increases forced labor exploitation 375 
Labor ownership (i.e., slave ownership) makes fishing more profitable and gives owners 376 
or operators a competitive advantage, essentially rewarding the use of cheap labor. Because 377 
decreasing fish stocks intensify effort and decrease profits, it indirectly increases demand for 378 
cheap labor and creates market forces that make impoverished migrant workers more vulnerable 379 
to exploitative labor practices (Chantavanich et al. 2016; UNODC 2011). As noted in Crane’s 380 
(2013) theory, in GVCs, when already narrow profits begin to dwindle because of increasing 381 
labor intensity, owners or operators will seek to zero their labor expenses, increasing the 382 
prevalence of forced labor exploitation because it becomes an economically rational decision. 383 
Increased forced labor exploitation increases profits 384 
Forced labor exploitation is an effective strategy for increasing profits because modern 385 
slavery is relatively inexpensive. Whereas slavery throughout the United States and Europe in 386 
the 17- and 1800s required the purchased of slaves, modern forced labor slavery relies on 387 




associated with the coercion and deception since intermediaries (i.e., recruiters and brokers) and 389 
boat captains exploit the pre-existing vulnerabilities created by geographic, regulatory, and 390 
cultural factors, and accentuated by the socioeconomic predictors.  Intermediaries deceive 391 
vulnerable persons (most often migrants) into these schemes by offering employment agreements 392 
with competitive wages that are never paid, or agreements with advanced wages, debt 393 
repayment, or equipment loans in exchange for labor until the “debt” to the employer is satisfied 394 
(i.e., debt bondage schemes which are one form of modern forced labor slavery). These schemes 395 
persist as employers continuously add new debts (e.g., for food and shelter) making repayment 396 
impossible, enslaving the laborer, and increasing the employer’s profits (Bales 2006, 2007, 2012; 397 
ILO 2005; IOM 2008; O’Neill 2011; Yea 2014). When labor exploitation increases profits, 398 
modern slavery exists (Bales 2006, 2007). 399 
Proposed pathways 400 
 Increased profit increases effort  401 
Once slaveholders in the fishing sector have perfected their strategy for minimizing cost 402 
and maximizing profit, they will continue to exploit this strategy as long as two conditions are 403 
met (Bales 2016). The first condition is the continued existence of a supply of slave labor, 404 
generated by socioeconomic and other inequities. The second condition is the continued global 405 
consumer demand for fish, driven primarily by industrialized nations. Between 1960 and 2010, 406 
the annual per capita fish consumption increased from 9.9 kilograms to 19.2 kilograms, driven 407 
primarily by industrialized countries, and predicated on a growing obsession with exotic fish 408 
products such as sushi, trade globalization, human population increases, and increasing scientific 409 
evidence of fish’s health benefits (FAO 2014). While the least developed countries saw an 410 




nations, despite the overreliance on fish for subsistence (FAO 2014). As such, Crane (2013) 412 
hypothesizes that enslaving migrants through forced labor exploitation will “effectively lock in 413 
low-price labor,” institutionalizing the practice (p. 56). 414 
 Increased effort decreases fish stocks 415 
Because perpetrators of forced labor slavery are profit motivated and already operating 416 
outside laws and regulations, it is unlikely they will comply with binding laws that lack 417 
enforcement or international soft laws bereft of punitive consequences for overfishing or slavery 418 
violations, or that they will comply with equipment restrictions and/or catch limitations if their 419 
actions are increasing profitability (Bales 2016). Thus the use of slavery could perpetuate 420 
overfishing by delaying the unprofitability. Additionally, if forced labor does further decrease the 421 
risk associated with IUU, then the increased use of slavery could contribute to even higher rates 422 
of IUU fishing—already an identified driver of overfishing and marine fish stock declines (FAO 423 
2014; Global Ocean Commission 2013). However, though the co-occurrence of IUU fishing and 424 
forced labor slavery has been documented (see EJF 2015b), the relationship between the two 425 
problems remains poorly understood and under researched.  426 
Conclusion 427 
The proposed framework’s utility is in connecting theories that have long been siloed in 428 
individual disciplines. These transformative connections thus have the potential to provide a 429 
strong foundation for future empirical testing; develop causal theories—including bidirectional 430 
and cyclic theories; identify modifiable factors as intervention points; and elevating the need for 431 
multiple entry points to address linked social-ecological problems. As the measurement of all 432 
forms of slavery evolves and continues to improve (Bales 2017; Larsen and Diego-Rosell 2017; 433 




further understanding of forced labor slavery—including its external contributing factors, 435 
contributions to environmental degradation, and most efficacious modification points. 436 
The proposed framework and suggested construct definitions and indicators provides the 437 
basis for modeling case scenarios and identifying feedback loops in social-ecological systems. 438 
Rather than emphasizing a singular causal factor (either direction), the framework’s application 439 
is intended to account for the complex, interrelatedness of variables in the linked system.  Thus, 440 
elucidating an understanding of how social and ecological conditions interact to create 441 
feedbacks. Better identification of these feedback loops can also help model repercussions of 442 
policy and governance decisions—the most likely intervention mechanism. Too often policies 443 
are constructed to deal with problems in isolation, limiting the authority of enforcement means in 444 
addressing problems outside of this limited purview. Because multiple factors, that are 445 
themselves interrelated, contribute to slavery in the industry, research and interventions 446 
(including policy responses) need to be multifaceted and implemented in unison or 447 
complementary approaches.  448 
While the proposed framework has not yet been empirically validated, and empirical 449 
evidence to support the relationship between natural marine environmental decline and forced 450 
labor slavery may be difficult to obtain, it is important to continue moving the field forward. 451 
Connecting theories that have long been segregated in individual disciplines provides a strong 452 
foundation for future empirical testing. Without this progress, the potential linkages between 453 
marine environmental decline and social conflicts will continue to perpetuate social-ecological 454 
injustices such as slavery in the marine fisheries sector which simultaneously perpetuates human 455 







AGNEW, David J., PEARCE, John, PRAMOD, Ganapathiraju, PEATMAN, Tom, WATSON, 460 
 Reg, BEDDINGTON, John R., and PITCHER, Tony J. (2009) Estimating the worldwide  461 
 extent of illegal fishing. PLoS ONE, 4(2), e4570. 462 
ANDREES, Beate. (2008) Forced Labour and Trafficking in Europe: How People are Trapped  463 
in, Live through and Come Out (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO). 464 
BALES, Kevin. (2006) Testing a Theory of Modern Slavery (Washington, D. C.: Free the  465 
Slaves). 466 
BALES, Kevin. (2007) What predicts human trafficking? International Journal of Comparative  467 
and Applied Criminal Justice, 31(2), 269-279.  468 
BALES, Kevin. (2012) Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (Berkeley, CA:  469 
 University of California Press). 470 
BALES, Kevin. (2016). Blood and Earth: Modern Slavery, Ecocide, and the Secret to Saving the  471 
World (New York: Spiegel & Grau). 472 
BALES, Kevin. (2017) Unlocking the statistics of slavery. CHANCE, 30(3), 4-12.  473 
BARNER, J. R., OKECH, D., and CAMP, Meghan A. (2014) Socio-economic inequality, human  474 
 trafficking, and the global slave trade. Societies, 4(2), 148-160. 475 
BARRIENTOS, Stephanie, KOTHARI, Uma, and PHILLIPS, Nicola. (2013) Dynamics of  476 
unfree labour in the contemporary global economy. The Journal of Development Studies,  477 
49(8), 1037-1041.  478 
BELL, Justin D., WATSON, Reg A., and YE, Yimin. (2017) Global fishing capacity and fishing  479 
effort from 1950 to 2012. Fish and Fisheries, 18, 489-505. 480 




Canadian Journal of Economics, 4, 74-85.  482 
BRASHARES, Justin S., ABRAHMS, Briana, FIORELLA, Kathryn J., GOLDEN, Christopher  483 
D., HOJNOWSKI, Cheryl E., MARSH, Ryan A., McCAULEY, Douglas J., NUÑEZ,  484 
Tristan A., SETO, Katherine, and WITHEY, Lauren (2014) Wildlife decline and social  485 
conflict. Science, 345(6195), 376-378.  486 
BROWN, Gardner M. (2000) Renewable natural resource management and use without markets.  487 
 Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVIII, 875-914. 488 
CHANTAVANICH, Supang, LAODUMRONGCHAI, Samarn, and STRINGER, Christina  489 
(2016) Under the shadow: Forced labour among sea fishers in Thailand. Marine Policy, 490 
68, 1-7. 491 
CHUANG, Janie. (2006) Beyond a snapshot: Preventing human trafficking in the global  492 
economy. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 13(1).  493 
CINNER, Joshua E., DAW, T., and McCLANAHAN, Timothy R. (2009). Socioeconomic  494 
factors that affect artisanal fishers’ readiness to exit a declining fishery. Conservation  495 
Biology, 23(1), 124-130. 496 
CLARK, Colin W. (1990) Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable  497 
Resources, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons). 498 
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor 1930, CO29, signed 28 June 1930, entered  499 
 into force 1 May 1932. 500 
CRANE, Andrew. (2013) Modern slavery as a management practice: Exploring the conditions  501 
and capabilities for human exploitation. Academy of Management Review, 38(1), 49-69. 502 
Creel, L. (2003). Ripple Effects: Population and Coastal Regions. (Washington, D. C.:  503 




DASKALOV, Georgi M. (2002) Overfishing drives a trophic cascade in the Black Sea. Marine  505 
Ecology Progress Series, 225, 53-63.  506 
DAWID, Richard. (2006) Underdeterimination and theory succession from the perspective of  507 
string theory. Philosophy of Science, 73(3), 298-322.  508 
DAWID, Richard, Hartmann, Stephan, and Sprenger, Jan. (2015) The no alternatives argument.  509 
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66(1), 213-234.  510 
DOLMAR, Evsey D. (1970) The causes of slavery or serfdom: A hypothesis. The Tasks of  511 
Economic History, 30(1), 18-32.  512 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION (EJF). (2014) Slavery at Sea: The Continued  513 
Plight of Trafficked Migrants in Thailand’s Fishing Industry (London, UK: EJF). 514 
EJF. (2015a) Thailand’s Seafood Slaves: Human Trafficking, Slavery and Murder in Kantang’s  515 
Fishing Industry (London, UK: EJF). 516 
EJF. (2015b). Pirates and Slaves: How Overfishing in Thailand Fuels Human Trafficking and  517 
the Plundering of our Oceans (London, UK: EJF). 518 
FISHWISE. (2014) Trafficked II: An Updated Summary of Human Rights Abuses in the Seafood  519 
Industry (Santa Cruz, CA: FishWise). 520 
FLETCHER, Laurel E., BALES, Kevin, and STOVER, Eric. (2005) Hidden slaves: Forced labor  521 
in the United States. Berkeley Journal of International Law, 23(1), 47-111.  522 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FAO). (2002)  523 
A Fishery Manager’s Guidebook: Management Measures and their Application (FAO  524 
Fisheries Technical Paper No. 424) (Rome: FAO). 525 
FAO. (2003) The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible  526 




FAO. (2011). Marine Protected Areas and Fisheries (FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible  528 
Fisheries No. 4, Suppl. 4) (Rome: FAO). 529 
FAO. (2014) The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Opportunities and Challenges  530 
(Rome, Italy: FAO). 531 
FAO. (2016) The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Contributing to Food Security and  532 
 Nutrition for All (Rome: FAO). 533 
Free the Slaves. (2017) Frequently Asked Questions: Slavery Questions & Answers. [Online].  534 
Available: http://www.freetheslaves.net/about-slavery/faqs-glossary/ [6 February 2017]. 535 
GASCUEL, Didier, COLL, Marta, FOX, Clive, GUÉNETTE, Sylvie, GUITTON, Jérome,  536 
KENNY, Andrew, KNITTWEIS, Leyla, RASMUS NIELSEN, J., PIET, Gerjan, RAID,  537 
Tiit, TRAVERS-TROLET, Morgane, and SHEPARD, Samuel. (2016) Fishing impact  538 
and environmental status in European seas: A diagnosis from stock assessments and  539 
ecosystem indicators. Fish and Fisheries, 17, 31-55.  540 
GJERDE, Kristina M., CURRIE, Duncan, WOWK, Kateryna, and SACK, Karen. (2013) Ocean  541 
in peril: Reforming the management of global ocean living resources in areas beyond 542 
national jurisdiction. Marine Pollution Bulletin, 74(2), 540-551.  543 
Global Ocean Commission. (2013) Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Policy Options  544 
Paper No. 8) (Oxford, UK: Global Ocean Commission).  545 
GOLDEN, Christopher D., ALLISON, Edward H., CHEUNG, William W. L., DEY, Madan M.,  546 
 HALPERN, Benjamin S., McCAULEY, Douglas, J., SMITH, Matthew, VAITLA, Bapu,  547 
 ZELLER, Dirk, and MYERS, Samuel S. (2016) Fall in fish catch threatens human health.  548 
 Nature, 534(7607), 317-320. 549 




fishing industry: Contributions of value chain analysis. Marine Policy, 63, 166-171.  551 
HARLEY, Shelton J., MYERS, Ransom A., and DUNN, Alistair (2001) Is catch-per-unit-effort  552 
proportional to abundance? Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 58(9),  553 
1760-1772.  554 
HART, Keith (1973) Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana. The  555 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 11(1), 61-89.  556 
HUTCHINGS, Jeffrey A., and MYERS, Ransom A. (1995) The biological collapse of Atlantic  557 
cod off Newfoundland and Labrador: An exploration of historical changes in  558 
exploitation, harvesting technology, and management. The North Atlantic Fisheries, 3,  559 
37-93. 560 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO). (2005) A Global Alliance Against  561 
Forced Labour (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO). 562 
ILO. (2009) The Cost of Coercion: Global Report Under the Follow-Up to the ILO Declaration  563 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO). 564 
ILO. (2013). Caught at Sea: Forced labor and Trafficking in Fisheries (Geneva, Switzerland:  565 
ILO). 566 
ILO & WALK FREE FOUNDATION. (2017) Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced  567 
Labour and Forced Marriage (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO). 568 
INETRNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM). (2008) Human Trafficking:  569 
New Directions for Research (Geneva, Switzerland: IOM International). 570 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (ITUC), and SPECIAL ACTION  571 
 PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR, ILO. (2008) Forced Labour: Mini  572 




INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION (ITF). (2006) Out of Sight, Out  574 
of Mind: Seafarers, Fishers, and Human Rights (London, UK: ITF). 575 
JACCARD, James, and JACOBY, Jacob. (2010) Theory Construction and Model-Building  576 
Skills: A Practical Guide for Social Scientists (New York, NY: The Guilford Press). 577 
KITTINGER, John N., TEH, Lydia C. L., ALLISON, Edward H., BENNETT, Nathan J.,  578 
CROWDER, Larry B., FINKBEINER, Elena M., HICKS, Christina, SCARTON, Cheryl  579 
G., NAKAMURA, Katrina, OTA, Yoshitaka, YOUNG, Jhana, ALIFANO, Aurora,  580 
APEL, Ashley, ARBIB, Allison, BISHOP, Lori, BOYLE, Mariah,  581 
CISNEROS-MONTEMAYOR, Andrés M., HUNTER, Philip, LE CORNU, Elodie,  582 
LEVINE, Max, JONES, Richard S., KOEHN, Zachary, MARSCHKE, M., MASON,  583 
Julia G., MICHELI, Fiorenza, McCLENACHAN, Loren., OPAL, Charlotte, PEACEY,  584 
Jonathan, PECKHAM, S. Hoyt, SCHEMMEL, E., SOLIS-RIVERA, V., SWARTZ, W.,  585 
WILHELM, T.’Aulani (2017) Committing to socially responsible seafood. Science,  586 
356(6341), 912-913.  587 
LIESE, Christopher, SMITH, Martin D., and KRAMER, Randall A. (2007) Open access in a  588 
spatially delineated artisanal fishery: The case of Minahasa, Indonesia. Environment and  589 
Development Economics, 12(1), 123-143.  590 
MACFARLANE, Douglas. (2017) The slave trade and the right of visit under the Law of the Sea  591 
Convention: Exploitation in the fishing industry in New Zealand and Thailand. Asian 592 
Journal of International Law, 7(1), 94-123.  593 
MANZO, Kate. (2005) Modern slavery, global capitalism, & deproletarianisation in West Africa.  594 
Review of African Political Economy, 32(106), 521-534.  595 




346(6211), 819. 597 
MAUNDER, Mark N., SIBERT, John R., FONTENEAU, Alain, HAMPTON, John, KLEIBER,  598 
Pierre, and HARLEY, Shelton J. (2006) Interpreting catch per unit effort data to assess  599 
the status of individual stocks and communities. ICES Journal of Marine Science:  600 
Journal du Conseil, 63(8), 1373-1385. 601 
MENDOZA, Martha, MCDOWELL, Robin, MASON, Margie, HTUSAN, Esther. (2016)  602 
Fisherman Slaves: Human Trafficking and the Seafood We Eat (New York, NY: AP  603 
Editions). 604 
NEUBAUER, Philipp, JENSEN, Olaf P., HUTCHINGS, Jeffrey A., and BAUM, Julia K. (2013)  605 
Resilience and recovery of overexploited marine populations. Science, 340(6130), 347-606 
349.  607 
O’NEILL, John. (2011) The Varieties of Unfreedom (Manchester Papers in Political Economy,  608 
No. 4/11) (Manchester, United Kingdom: University of Manchester). 609 
OSTROM, Elinor. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological  610 
systems. Science, 325(5939), 419-422.  611 
PAULY, Daniel, and ZELLER, Dirk. (2016) Catch reconstructions reveal that global marine  612 
fisheries catches are higher than reported and declining. Nature Communications, 7, 613 
10244. 614 
PERRY, Ian, and SUMAILA, U. Rashid (2007) Marine ecosystem variability and human  615 
 community responses: The example of Ghana, West Africa. Marine Policy, 31(2), 125- 616 
 134. 617 
PHILLIPS, Nicola, and MIERES, Fabiola (2015) The governance of forced labour in the global  618 




POMEROY, Robert, PARKS, John, MRAKOVCICH, Karina Lorenz, and LaMONICA,  620 
Christopher. (2016) Drivers and impacts of fisheries scarcity, competition, and conflict  621 
on maritime security. Marine Policy, 67, 94-104. 622 
PONTECORVO, Giulio, and SCHRANK, William E. (2012) The expansion, limit and decline of  623 
the global marine fish catch. Marine Policy, 36(5), 1178-1181.  624 
PONTECORVO, Giulio, and SCHRANK, William E. (2014). The continued decline in the  625 
world catch of marine fish. Marine Policy, 44, 117-119.  626 
ROBERTSON, Philip. (2011) Trafficking of Fishermen in Thailand (Bangkok, Thailand: IOM). 627 
ROSE, G. A., and KULKA, David W. (1999) Hyperaggregation of fish and fisheries: How  628 
catch-per-unit effort increases as the northern cod (Gadus morhua) declined. Canadian  629 
Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 56(S1), 118-127. 630 
SALA, Enric, MAYORGA, Juan, COSTELLO, Christopher, KROODSMA, David,  631 
 PALOMARES, Maria L. D., PAULY, Daniel, SUMAILA, U. Rashid, and ZELLER,  632 
Dirk. (2018) The economics of fishing the high seas. Science Advances, 4(6), eaat2504. 633 
SETHI, Suresh A., BRANCH, Trevor A., and WATSON, Reg. (2010) Global fishery  634 
development patterns are driven by profit but not trophic level. Proceedings of the  635 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(27), 12163-12167.  636 
Smith, Martin D. (2014) Fauna in decline: Management risks. Science, 346(6211), 819. 637 
SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOUR. (2012) ILO Indicators  638 
of Forced Labour (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO). 639 
STRINGER, Christina, and SIMMONS, Glenn. (2015) Stepping through the looking glass:  640 
Researching slavery in New Zealand’s fishing industry. Journal of Management Inquiry,  641 




STRINGER, Christina, WHITTAKER, D Hugh., and SIMMONS, G. (2016) New Zealand’s  643 
turbulent waters: The use of forced labour in the fishing industry. Global Networks,  644 
16(1), 3-24.  645 
SURTEES, Rebecca. (2005) Child Trafficking in Sierra Leone. [Online]. Available:  646 
https://nexushumantrafficking.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/child-trafficking-in-sierra-647 
leone.pdf [6 February 2017]. 648 
SUMAILA, U. R., ALDER, J., and KEITH, H. (2006) Global scope and economics of illegal  649 
 fishing. Marine Policy, 30, 696-703. 650 
TSIKLIRAS, Athanassios C., DINOULI, Anny, TSIROS, Vasileios-Zikos, and TSALKOU,  651 
 Eleni. (2015) The Mediterranean and BlackSea fisheries at risk from overexploitation.  652 
PLoS One, 10(3): e0121188.  653 
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (UNODC). (2011) Transnational  654 
Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry (Vienna, Austria: UNODC). 655 
UPADHYAYA, Krishna P. (2008) Poverty, Discrimination and Slavery: The Reality of Bonded  656 
Labour in India, Nepal and Pakistan (London: Anti-Slavery International). 657 
VERITÉ. (2016) Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal and  658 
Corporate Supply Chains: Research on Risk in 43 Commodities Worldwide (Amherst,  659 
MA: Verité). 660 
WATSON, Reg A., CHEUNG, William W. L., ANTICAMARA, Jonathan A., SUMAILA,  661 
 Rashid U., ZELLER, Dirk, and PAULY, Daniel. (2013) Global marine yield halved as  662 
fishing intensity redoubles. Fish and Fisheries, 14, 493-503.  663 
WHEATON, Elizabeth M., SCHAUER, Edward J., and GALLI, Thomas V. (2010) Economics  664 




WHITE, Crow, KENDALL, Bruce E., GAINES, Steven, SIEGEL, David A., and COSTELLO,  666 
 Christopher. (2008) Marine reserve effects on fishery profit. Ecology Letters, 11(4), 370- 667 
379.  668 
WORM, Boris, HILBORN, Ray, BAUM, Julia K., BRANCH, Trevor A., COLLIE, Jeremy S.,  669 
COSTELLO, Christopher, FOGARTY, Michael J., FULTON, Elizabeth A., 670 
HUTCHINGS, Jeffrey A., JENNINGS, S., JENSEN, Olaf P., LOTZE, Heike K., MACE, 671 
Pamela M., McCLANAHAN, Tim R., MINTO, Cóilín; PALUMBI, Stephen R., 672 
PARMA, Ana M., RICARD, Daniel, ROSENBERG, Andrew A., WATSON, Reg, and 673 
ZELLER, D. (2009) Rebuilding global fisheries. Science, 325(5940), 578-585.  674 
YEA, S. (2014). Trafficking on the high seas: The exploitation of migrant fisherman in South  675 
 East Asia’s long haul fishing industry. In Trafficking in Human Beings: Learnings from  676 
 Asian and European Experiences, Wilhelm Hofmeister and Patrick Rueppel (eds.)  677 
(Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung). 678 
